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.lure. In January 2002, after

lengthy and convoluted proceedings, the district court affirmed the Council's
determination that the Department's testing procedures were inconsistent, biased, and
violative of merit principles. The Court, however, concluded as a matter of law that the
Deputies' grievance was untimely because it was not filed within three months of the
Deputies being passed over for promotion in 1991.
The Council's factual determination that the Deputies did not leam of their cause
of action until December 1996 should have been afforded great deference because the
Council sat in a privileged position as fact finder. In addition, even to the extent
questions of law are involved, the district court should have given an extra measure of
deference to the Council because this case was brought under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Because the record supports the Council's first decision and the
district court's reversal was erroneous, the Council's June 30, 1997 decision should be
affirmed and the district court's January 2, 2002 Order Granting Petition for
Extraordinary Relief should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
In spite of the Council's repeated determination that the Deputies' grievance was
timely filed, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that the Deputies' grievance
was not timely. In their opening brief, the Deputies made three main arguments in
support of their contention that the district court's January 2002 order should be reversed:
First, the district court should not have reviewed the Council's timeliness
determination as a pure question of law, but should instead have given considerable
deference to the Council's finding of fact that the Deputies did not know of their injury
2

until they uncovered evidence of administrative corruption involving at least one
promotional test, which led to their December 1996 meeting with Sheriff Bateman, which
led, in turn, to their uncovering the Department's clear pattern and practice of violating
merit principles in each and every promotional process from 1991 to 1996. Because the
district court did not afford the Council's timeliness determination any deference, the
district court should be reversed and the Council's original timeliness determination
reinstated. Second, because the Council's timeliness determination is supported by the
record, it should have been allowed to stand. Third, even assuming that the proper
standard of review is de novo, for correctness, and even to the extent questions of law
may be involved, the Council's timeliness determination should still be affirmed. Under
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the lower tribunal's ruling should be
given an extra measure of deference, even when the decision involves an issue of law.
Thus, the Council's determination should have been reversed only if it amounted to a
gross and flagrant abuse of discretion.
In response, the County argued that the Council's decision should be reviewed for
abuse of discretion, as that term is routinely applied in cases not brought under Rule
65B—a standard this Court has referred to as "garden variety" abuse of discretion review.
(Br. Aplee. at 11-14) The County also agreed with the Deputies' assertion that review of
a statute of limitations issue is a legal question, which involves a "'subsidiary factual
determination"' that should be reversed only for clear error. (Aplee. Br. at 14 (quoting
Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24, Tf32).) The County also advanced the argument, one
that had been rejected by the Council on at least three occasions, that because the

•
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Deputies did not file a grievance within three months of the initial adverse promotion
decision, the grievance should be time-barred. Finally, the County argued that the
Council's finding that the Deputies' discovery of relevant facts was the trigger date for
the three-month rule was clearly erroneous, and that the Deputies cannot rely on either
the discovery rule or equitable estoppel.
None of the arguments advanced by the County warrants affirming the district
court's January 2002 order. The issue posed by this case is not, as the County suggests,
whether "the Deputies fail[ed] to timely file their grievance with the . . . Council within
three months from the date of the occurrence . . . ." (Br. Aplee. at 1) The Deputies have
never contended that they filed within three months of the December 1991 denial of
promotion. Moreover, that question was considered by the finder of fact—the Council—
and its determination was reaffirmed on several occasions. (Br. Aplt. at 12-17) Instead,
the issue before this Court is what standard of review should be applied to the Council's
determination. As discussed in the Deputies' opening brief, the district court should have
afforded considerable deference to the Council's finding of fact regarding the trigger date
for the three-month rule. Because the district court incorrectly reviewed the Council's
decision as a matter of law, affording no deference to its findings of fact, the district court
should be reversed and the Council's initial determination upheld.
1.

The County has not shown that the Council's determination was
subject to a "garden variety" abuse of discretion standard of review.

The core issue in this case is whether the district court applied the proper standard
of review to the Council's determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely. The
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Council's determination is analogous to a statute of limitations analysis, and thus should
be reviewed as a mixed question of fact and law, with considerable deference afforded to
the Council's subsidiary findings of fact. In addition, because this case involves a
petition brought under Rule 65, even to the extent questions of law are involved—and to
the degree a statute of limitations-type analysis involves the resolution of legal issues—
the Council's determination should be disturbed only if it was a gross and flagrant abuse
of discretion.1
In its response brief, the County concedes that in the analogous area of statute of
limitations analysis, the proper standard of review is as a mixed question of fact and law.
(Br. Aplee. at 14-15.) The case of Spears v. Reynolds, cited by the County,
acknowledges precisely the two-part standard of review argued by the Deputies in their
opening brief: "The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the
discovery rule are questions of law which [are] review[ed] for correctness. . . . However,
the applicability of [these rules] also involves a subsidiary factual determination^ which
presents] a question of fact." Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24 at ^[32. Thus, there
appears to be no dispute that the Department's internal three-month rule should be
reviewed as a mixed question of fact and law. As a result, the Council's determination
that the Deputies5 grievance was timely filed should be reversed "only if the ruling
'contradicts the great weight of evidence or if [the] court reviewing the evidence is left
1

As a technical matter, this Court reviews the Council's decision directly and affords no
deference to the district court's ruling. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d
23, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The deputies submit that had the district court applied the
proper standard, as this Court now must do, the Council's decision would have been
upheld and the County's petition denied.
5

with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'"" Maoris v.
Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, f 14, 24 P.3d 984 (citations omitted). It is
undisputed that the district court did not apply this standard in reversing the Council.
In spite of this concession that a mixed standard of review is appropriate, the
County tries to minimize the deference owed the Council's timeliness determination by
contending that because the County brought the case as a Rule 65B(d) petition for
extraordinary relief, overall review should be under the traditional, garden-variety abuse
of discretion standard.2 (Br. Aplee. at 11-14)
The County also incorrectly asserts that our appellate courts have "only applied
the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard when an appeal is statutorily
prohibited," and relies on the cases of Renn v. Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 667 (Utah
1995), and State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), in support of this
proposition. (Br. Aplee. at 13) However, the "gross and flagrant" standard articulated in
Renn and Stirba is not so limited.
It is true that both the Renn and Stirba courts expressed their concerns that
impermissible appeals should not be allowed. See Renn, 904 P.2d at 683; Stirba, 972
P.2d at 920. Under the facts of those cases, such concern was appropriate. However, that
2

The County's citation to the Tolman discussion of abuse of discretion adds little to its
argument. (Br. Aplee. at 13-14.) First, the Tolman case was decided well before Renn
and Stirba. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App.
1991). Second, and more importantly, Tolman's discussion of the abuse of discretion
standard was a general effort to clear up some imprecision in the terms used to discuss
standards of review. Tolman's statements regarding the abuse of discretion standard
must be seen in context, as part of a continuing evolution of standards of review in Utah
that led to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)
and subsequent decisions applying those standards.
6

element was not dispositive in either case. Stirba involved a challenge to the district
court's denial of the crime victims' request for restitution. See Stirba, 972 P.2d at 920.
In its discussion of the victims' Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) petition—the section under which the
County's petition for extraordinary writ was brought—the court applied the "gross and
flagrant" standard first articulated in Renn. In so doing, however, the court did not limit
its standard-of-review discussion solely to situations in which the petitioner sought to
bring a statutorily-prohibited appeal. Instead, the court simply stated that '"abuse of
discretion' for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much more blatant than the garden
variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in routine appellate review." Id. at 922.
The Stirba court concluded that the district court had incorrectly interpreted the
law as expressed in the governing restitution statute. Nonetheless, the court concluded
that the incorrect conclusion did not warrant reversal because "a simple mistake of the
law does not qualify as the kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for a
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue." Id. at 923. The court's eventual conclusion that the
district court's error of law was not "blatant" enough for the writ to issue was based on
two separate and independent factors: first, the heightened deference given to the lower
tribunal's exercise of discretion; and second, the court's concern about not allowing a
party to pursue a statutorily-prohibited appeal.
That these are two separate, independent concerns is made clear in the conclusion,
wherein the court stated that it was denying the petition "[b]ased on our determination
that Judge Stirba neither failed to perform a legally-required act under Rule 65B(d)(2)(B)
nor abused her discretion under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), coupled with our holding that the
7

State's action is tantamount to an impermissible appeal[.]" Id. (Emphasis added.) In
other words, whether the district court committed a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion
was an independent determination, and was not based solely on the fact that the
petitioners' appeals were not authorized by statute. Renn and Stirba are simply not as
limited as the County suggests.
Moreover, contrary to the County's assertion that Renn and Stirba are the only two
cases employing the "gross and flagrant" abuse of discretion standard, that standard has
been applied in at least two other cases, neither of which involved an appellant's seeking
to circumvent a statutory bar to appeal, SQQ Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 056, 975
P.2d 946; Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. v. Bench, 929 P.2d 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
In Dean, the petitioner appealed a Salt Lake County Justice Court conviction. See Dean,
1999 UT App 056 at f 1. The district court then scheduled a pretrial conference, and the
petitioner twice failed to appear. In seeking an extraordinary writ, the petitioner sought
to compel the district court to reinstate his appeal of the justice court's conviction. On
review, this Court concluded the district court's remand was improper, and cited Stirba's
statement that, for purposes of a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ, "'"[a]buse of discretion'" . . .
must be much more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in
routine appellate review.'" IcL at | 1 3 .
In the Indian Village case, a fire marshal had "redtagged" the petitioner's property,
thereby prohibiting the petitioner from occupying the buildings on the redtagged
property. See Indian Village, 929 P.2d at 368. The petitioner sought extraordinary relief
under Rule 65, and the district court ultimately concluded that the fire marshal had not
8

abused his discretion in redtagging the property. On appeal, the court of appeals applied
the same standard articulated in Renn, Stirba, and Dean, noting that historically
mandamus (upon which the Rule 65B extraordinary writ is based) was meant to address
"situations where officials have acted, but have greatly exceeded the scope of their lawful
discretion." Id. at 370 (emphasis added). The same highly deferential standard applies
to petitions brought under Rule 65B(e), under which "a petitioner may seek . . . to compel
correction of a public officer's gross abuse of discretion." Id. (emphasis added.)
In sum, the County has failed to show that the Council's decision should be
reviewed under a "garden-variety" abuse of discretion standard, or that such a result is
compelled by our appellate courts' previous statements of the proper standard of review
to be applied to a petition for extraordinary relief brought under Rule 65B. Instead, as
argued by the Deputies in their opening brief, the Council's determination is properly
reviewed as a mixed question of fact and law, affording considerable deference to the
Council's subsidiary findings of fact. In the alternative, and to the extent legal questions
are involved, the Council's determination should still be afforded considerable deference
under Rule 65B and should be reversed only for a "gross and flagrant" abuse of
discretion, under which standard a "simple mistake of law" is not enough to warrant
reversal. See Stirba, 972 P.2d at 923.
The district court did not apply either of these standards, and even the County
acknowledges that the correctness standard does not apply. Therefore, the Deputies
respectfully request that this Court reverse the district court's January 2002 ruling,

9

thereby reinstating the Council's determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely
filed.
2.

The three-month rule is not jurisdictional.

The County contends that the three-month filing rule found in the County's policy
and procedures manual is jurisdictional, and that because the Deputies did not file their
grievance within three months of the December 1991 decision not to promote them, the
grievance is flatly barred. In essence, the County is arguing that the Deputies missed a
statute of limitations—to which the three month rale is analogous, but not identical—and
therefore have irredeemably lost their cause of action. This argument fails for at least
two reasons.
First, the Deputies have never pretended that their grievance was filed within three
months of the December 1991 promotion decision. They knew that they were not
promoted in December 1991, but did not know the reasons why they were not promoted.
More specifically, the Deputies did not know until December 1996 that at least one
attempt was made by a high-ranking Department administrator to unlawfully influence
the testing process, or that the Sheriff had continually made promotion decisions based on
his admittedly erroneous assumption that the Deputies' positions as Shift Supervisors, a
Corporal rank, were unot a ranked position in the Department." (R. 341, 368) This
wrongful assumption deprived the Deputies of due consideration as ranked officers most
competent for promotion to Sergeant during every promotion cycle between 1991 and
1996. In addition, the Deputies' informal complaints to their supervisors after they were
effectively demoted to the lower rank of deputy were responded to with repeated
10

assurances that their concerns would be addressed internally, that they were eligible to
and should continue to participate in the promotion process, and that they ultimately
would be promoted to the rank of Sergeant. (R. 374)
It was also not until December 1996 that the Deputies confirmed that other
individuals who did not meet the job-related minimum qualifications had been promoted
in their place, in spite of being ineligible for promotion under the Department's own
policies, while the Deputies were fully-qualified under those same policies. (R. 373)
The Deputies also learned that the Department had failed to conduct legitimate meritbased testing, had failed to establish correct eligibility lists or appointment registers, and
had failed to make eligibility lists and appointment registers available for inspection by
applicants. (R. 374) The Council carefully reviewed each and every promotional process
used by the Department since 1991 and found that each was fundamentally flawed—the
Council concluded that the "promotions have been based on arbitrary criteria. The
current testing procedures appear inconsistent, biased and capricious." (R. 347-48).
Moreover, during these years the Deputies continued to test for promotions in
good faith, based on their fully-qualified status and repeated assurances by Department
management that they would be treated fairly as a result of the "reclassification" of the
Shift Supervisor position. The Deputies were urged to continue to apply for promotions
within the Department under considerable institutional pressure to rely on their
supervisors' encouraging statements, and conform with the Department's chain-ofcommand organizational structure, even though the promotion and eligibility
requirements fluctuated widely. Ultimately, after December 1996, the Deputies learned
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that the promotion and eligibility requirements had been consistently disregarded by both
the Department and the County Personnel Office. (R. 370)
Under these facts, the Council determined and repeatedly affirmed that the
Deputies did not discover, nor could they have discovered, the existence of their cause of
action until December 1996. Thus, this case is analogous to one in which a statute of
limitation is deemed not to have begun to run until the cause of action is discovered.
Second, unlike the 14-day rule set forth in a Draper City ordinance at issue in
Brendlev. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the sole case relied on by
the County in support of this argument, the three-month rule here is merely a creature of
the county's internal personnel rules, set out in a policy and procedures manual. The
three-month rule was not established by the legislature, or even by county ordinance.
The legislature has established a detailed set of statutes, the County Personnel
Management Act, to promote and regulate a merit system of personnel administration by
the counties. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-33-1 to -15. The legislature did not, however,
establish a time limit for filing grievances, even though it has established such limits in
the related area of appeals to Civil Service Commissions. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-31012(2). By not fixing a time limit within which an employee must file a grievance, the
legislature implicitly left the Council's "jurisdiction" in this regard open and subject to
whatever limit the Council deemed appropriate. Just as the Council had discretion to
establish the three-month time limit, so should it have had discretion to decide when, in
the interests of fairness, and consistent with its statutory mandate to be "in sympathy with
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application of merit principles to public employment," Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4, the
three-month time period should be deemed to have begun to rim.3
Interestingly, the Council itself fully understood the scope of its jurisdiction. In
its decision letter, the Council declined to award the Deputies their costs and attorneys
fees, stating "[t]he Council is unable to make a ruling on the attorneys fees and costs
because it is outside the scope of our authority." (R. 349) The Council clearly
understood the scope of its jurisdiction and acted well within it in deciding to hear the
Deputies' grievance and ultimately in granting the Deputies the majority of their
requested relief.
3.

The Council's timeliness determination was neither clearly erroneous
nor a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion.

The County contends that the record does not support a finding that the Deputies
did not know of the serious irregularities in the Department's promotion process until
after their December 1996 conversation with Sheriff Bateman. In addition, the County
contends that the only relevant consideration is when the Deputies knew that they were

3

Brendle is also distinguishable because it is grounded on an ordinance fixing a time
within which to appeal a zoning decision. Zoning is unusually dependent on the need for
various deadlines to be strictly observed while one is working through the process of
gaining approval. In this process, a party must step through successive levels of seeking
authority in order to advance to the next stage of the process, and all other parties
involved (including the public) must be able to rely on compliance with one step before
advancing to the next. Here, it is understandable why the failure to meet such a deadline
would be grounds for disregarding a claim. In contrast, the three month rule at issue in
this case is more akin to a statute of limitations governing the filing of a complaint for
negligence; it does not present the same multi-layered, complex set of deadlines and
procedures posed by the zoning process, nor is there the need for public certainty.
13

not promoted and that other deputies not meeting minimum requirements were promoted.
In this regard, the County is re-arguing the facts. As discussed in section 2 above and in
the Deputies' opening brief, the Deputies have never disputed that they knew in 1991 that
they had not been promoted. Instead, the reasons why the ranked Deputies had not been
logically promoted to the next rank were unknown to them until December 1996 since
there was no merit testing process in 1991 to explain the promotion rationale. Moreover,
the Deputies would have no way of knowing the qualifications of those promoted above
them. This knowledge was critical to their ability to know they had a cause of action
upon which a grievance could be made.
As the County's lengthy marshaling effort shows, there is sufficient record
evidence to support the Council's finding that the Deputies' grievance was timely filed.
(Br. Aplee. at 21-26.) There simply has not been a showing that the Council's timeliness
determination was "'so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the
evidence."'" West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
4.

The County has failed to show that application of the discovery rule
was not warranted under these facts.

Finally, the County argues that the discovery rule should not apply to the facts of
this case. The County's effort on appeal to re-argue the facts highlights precisely why
our appellate courts grant such considerable deference to the lower tribunal's findings of
fact, and their interpretation of their own internal rules, overturning them only if there is
no support in the record for the finding. The Council found that the Deputies' grievance
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was timely. (Br. Aplt. at 12-17) If the correct standard of review is applied to the
Council's determination, this timeliness finding should be allowed to stand.
In addition, the County argues that the exceptional circumstances prong of the
discovery rule cannot apply to this case, because under the balancing test articulated in
Sew v. Security Title, Inc., 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995), the hardship to the County
outweighs any hardship to the Deputies. The County relies primarily on the fact that, due
to the passage of time, "the claim has aged to the point that witnesses cannot be located,
evidence cannot be found, and the parties cannot remember basic events." Id at 636. In
this regard, it is important to note that any delay in this case has been caused not by the
Deputies, but by the Department's continued concealment of the reasons for the
inconsistencies in its promotion process, its failure to conduct open and fair testing, its
refusal to publish eligibility lists and other basic information required by statute to be
published, its failure to explain to the Deputies the reasons why they were denied
promotion, and its repeated assurance that the Department would make things right. The
Deputies could not have known at any point between December 1991 and December
1996 that they had been denied promotion based on the Sheriffs erroneous assumption
that Shift Supervisor was not a ranked position within the Department. (Br. Aplt. at 1415.) Once they learned this, they acted promptly in asserting their claims.
CONCLUSION
The Council's determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely filed, and
that the three-month rule began to run in December 1996 when the Deputies learned the
facts necessary to create their cause of action, should have been reviewed by the district
15

court as a mixed question of fact and law, with considerable deference afforded the
Council's subsidiary findings of fact. And because the district court's review was
pursuant to Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), the Council's determination should have been reversed
only for a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion. Under this highly deferential standard,
the Council's timeliness determination should have been allowed to stand.
Because the district court improperly reviewed the Council's determination for
correctness, affording no deference to the Council's superior ability to implement
personnel rules and evaluate the credibility of the evidence presented to it on three
separate occasions, this Court should reverse the district court's order granting the
County's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. Such a reversal would, in effect, reinstate the
Council's determination that the Deputies filed timely.
Such a reversal would also serve the interests of justice. If there is any doubt
regarding the timeliness of the Deputies' filing, equity and the interests of justice demand
that the doubt be resolved in favor of the Deputies' case being resolved on the merits,
rather than by a procedural ruling based on an erroneous application of the law. The fact
that the Deputies were wronged by the Department's continued pattern and practice of
inconsistent, biased, and capricious promotional testing and its failure to comply with
merit principles was recognized repeatedly by the Council and the district court, and it
has not been challenged on appeal. The Deputies took considerable risk in challenging
the Department and believe that if the Department is not sent a clear message that it must
comply with merit principles, it may continue to disregard them.
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